Here is an article in the Washington Post by Mike Konczal on an anti-rentier politics.  He refers to a series of three blog posts at Salon by Michael Lind, and a paper by Michael Hardt.

Here is an article that argues that a public justification, in the sense articulated by John Rawls, exists for granting government recognition and conferring benefits on opposite-sex marriages, but that no such public justification exists for doing so for same-sex marriages.

Here is the Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment report on the use of torture in the so-called War of Terrorism.

Here is a paper by Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich on the employment effects of raising the minimum wage.

Jane Slaughter on how a group of workers in Mexico purchased a tire factory after a three-year strike called to oppose the factory being shut down, and then began running the factory as a worker-owned cooperative.

An interview with Alex Gourevitch on the labor republican critique of wage labor as a kind of wage slavery.

Saint Francis

In these last days
the grace of God our Savior has appeared
in his servant Francis
to all who are truly humble and lovers of holy poverty.
In him
they can venerate God’s superabundant mercy
and be taught by his example
to utterly reject ungodliness and worldly passions,
to live in conformity with Christ
and to thirst after blessed hope with unflagging
He was poor and lowly,
but the Most High God looked upon him
with such condescension and kindness
that he not only lifted him up in his need
from the dust of a worldly life,
but made him a practitioner, a leader and a herald
of Gospel perfection
and set him up as a light for believers
so that by bearing witness to the light
he might prepare for the Lord
a way of light and peace into the hearts of his faithful.

From The Life of St. Francis, by Bonaventure (tr. Donna Tartt).

Habemus Papum!

ABC News’ report is here.  He is from Argentina.  His name is Jorge Mario Bergoglio, now Pope Francis.

Here is the Catholic Herald’s profile of the new pope, which has this to say:

And then, of course, there is that Trappist silence. His press secretary, a young priest, spends his time interpreting what the Cardinal does not say. The other part of his job is to turn down, on Bergoglio’s behalf, interviews or invitations to write articles. The Archbishop of Buenos Aires has almost no published work, and seems to become less visible with each passing year.

When he does speak, however – in the annual Te Deums preached from the cathedral – it is dramatic. Bergoglio thunders like an Old Testament prophet; the government quakes in its boots.

Zenit says this about the significance of the choice of the name Francis:

Pope Francis has worked with the Curia, but he is an outsider, not an insider. He said the cardinals went to the “end of the earth” to find him. And he picks a name not ever used before. This marks something new. Francis of Assisi was asked by God to rebuild his Church. He at first thought it was the run-down church of San Damiano. He soon learned it was the whole Church, through a humble living of the Gospel.  Pope Francis I will be a man of reform. He has an Italian last name but a new fresh perspective. It will not be business as usual in Rome for long.

Here is John Allen’s profile.

And Sandro Magister’s, which includes this anecdote:

Someone in the Vatican had the idea to call him to direct an important dicastery. “Please, I would die in the Curia,” he implored.  They spared him.

He is spared no longer.

Philosopher John Haldane’s has this take over at First Things.

Lorenzo Albacete has this wonderful reflection on the true significance of the papacy:

Their reports sought to explain the events in Rome in terms of the election of American presidents. Some of the comparisons were clever and descriptive. Reports also dealt with the religious basis of the events. Even prayer and the Holy Spirit made their appearance in the reports.

Still, very few if any overcame the error mentioned at the beginning of this column, namely, the Church was looking for a leader who would be able and strong to clean up the scandal-ridden administration, and spiritual enough to attract the diversity of people for which other religions are competing as well as a secularism threatening all.

But this is not how we understand the mission of the Pope.

Before being someone with a job to do, he is the one sent to us to hear, see, and touch, whose physical presence is what links us to Christ. He is the custodian of the Incarnation.

My thoughts:  The news media seem to understand the Church on an analogy with a certain U.S. political party that recently lost an election decisively and is now repositioning itself on the issues in order to make itself more attractive to certain groups of voters.  The Church is not like that. Her obligation is to the truth; popularity is irrelevant.  The Church cannot change her teachings, even to become more popular or more modern.  She cannot teach one thing at one time, and the opposite thing at another time.  If she ever did, then she must be wrong at one of the times or the other or both.  But if the Church were ever wrong that would undermine her claim to possess teaching authority.  Each generation of Church leaders has the sacred obligation hold on to the deposit of faith, i.e., the teachings of the Church, handed down to them by the previous generation of Church leaders and by all the generations that came before them for 2,000 years all the way back to Peter, to proclaim those teachings to the world in their time, and in turn to pass them down  whole and uncorrupted to the next generation of Church leaders that will come after them.  The relentless focus in the news media on what the choice of new pope may portend for changes in Church teaching fails to appreciate the claims that the Church makes about herself.


Adam Liptak has an article in the New York Times describing the unequal apportionment in the U.S. Senate and the impact that it has on our politics.  Here is an excerpt:

But the Senate is in contention for the least democratic legislative chamber.  In some other countries with federal systems, in which states or provinces have independent political power, a malapportioned upper house may have only a weak or advisory role.  In the United States, the Senate is at least equal in power to the House, and it possesses some distinctive responsibilities, like treaty ratification and the approval of presidential appointments.  A recent appeals court decision severely limiting the president’s power to make recess appointments, if it stands, will further increase the Senate’s power.

Professor Dahl has calculated the difference between the local government unit with the most voting power and that with the least. The smallest ratio, 1.5, was in Austria, while in Belgium, Spain,  India, Germany, Australia and Canada the ratio was never higher than 21 to 1.

In this country, the ratio between Wyoming’s representation and California’s is 66 to 1.  By that measure, Professor Dahl found, only Brazil, Argentina and Russia had less democratic chambers.  A separate analysis, by David Samuels and Richard Snyder, similarly found that geographically large countries with federal systems tend to overrepresent sparsely populated areas.



Round-Up On Labor Unions and the 2012 Election

Here’s some links on labor unions and the 2012 election:

Plantinga on the possibility of miracles

This is the third in a series of posts discussing Alvin Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies. The first post is here and the second post is here.

The second specific area of alleged conflict between science and theism that Plantinga considers is the supposed conflict between theists belief in miracles and scientific laws. A miracle, it is argued, is as an event that happens contrary to the scientific laws of nature. But if that is so, then to assert that a miracle has occurred is to assert that in at least one instance God has broken or violated a scientific law of nature.

This is a misunderstanding of scientific laws. Scientific laws describe how things in the world behave when not subject to any force outside the world such as God. They must be understood as implicitly including the caveat that they apply only when God is not acting in the world by special devine action. Plantinga states:

So thought of, the natural laws offer no threat to special divine action. Miracles are often thought t obe problematic, in that God, if he were to perform a miracle, would be involved in “breaking,” going contrary to, abrogating, suspending, a natural law. But given this conception of law, if God were to perform a miracle, it wouldn’t at all involve contravening a natural law. This is because, obviously, any occasion on which God performs a miracle is an occasion when the universe is not causally closed; and the laws say nothing about what happens when the universe is not causally closed. Indeed, on this conception it isn’t even possible that God break a law of nature. For to break a law, he would have to act specially in the world; yet at any time at which he acted specially in the world would be a time at which the universe is not causally closed; hence no law applies to the circumstance in question and hence no law gets broken.

Moreover, as Plantinga also argues, quantum mechanics asserts that the universe is not deterministic even on the assumption that it is causally closed.

Plantinga on the Theory of Evolution

This is the second in a series of posts discussing Alvin Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies.  The first post is here.

The first claim made by Plantinga is that science and theism are not incompatible.  He considers a number of specific areas of alleged conflict and shows that upon careful examination there is in fact no conflict.  The first specific area of alleged conflict that he considers is the Darwinian theory of evolution.

Some think that theism and the Darwinian theory of evolution are in conflict – that theism makes (or implies) claims that are denied by the Darwinian theory of evolution and vice versa.  If that is so, then theism and the Darwinian theory of evolution cannot both be true.  If theism is true, then the Darwinian theory of evolution is false, and if the Darwinian theory of evolution is true, then theism is false. Plantinga, however, argues that theism and the Darwinian theory of evolution are compatible – i.e., that it is logically possible that theism and the Darwinian theory of evolution are both true.

Plantinga distinguishes between several different claims commonly thought to be included within the theory of evolution.

(1) There is the claim that the earth is very old, perhaps some 4.5 billion years old: the ancient earth thesis, as we may call it. (2) There is the claim that life has progressed from relatively simple to relatively complex forms (though in terms of sheer bulk or weight the simple forms still vastly overshadow the complex; bacteria outweigh all other living creatures combined). In the beginning there was relatively simple unicellular life, perhaps of the sort represented by bacteria and blue-green algae, or perhaps still simpler unknown forms of life. (Although bacteria are simple compared to some other living beings, they are in fact enormously complex creatures.) Then more complex unicellular life, then relatively simple multi-cellular life such as seagoing worms, coral, and jellyfish, then fish, then amphibia, then reptiles, birds, mammals, and finally, as the current culmination of the whole process, human beings: the progress thesis, as we humans may like to call it (jellyfish might have a very different view as to where the whole process culminates). (3) There is the thesis of descent with modification: the enormous diversity of the contemporary living world has come about by way of offspring differing, ordinarily in small and subtle ways, from their parents.

Connected with the thesis of descent with modification is (4) the common ancestry thesis: that life originated at only one place on earth, all subsequent life being related by descent to those original living creatures – the claim that, as Gould puts it, there is a “tree of evolutionary descent linking all organisms by ties of genealogy.” According to the common ancestry thesis, we are all cousins of each other – and indeed all living things. Horses, bats, bacteria, oak trees, and even poison ivy – we are all cousins under the skin (rind). (5) There is the claim that there is a naturalistic mechanism driving this process of descent with modification: the most popular candidate is natural selection operating on random genetic mutation, although some other processes are also sometimes proposed. Since a similar proposal was characteristic of Darwin (“Natural selection,” he said, “has been the main but not exclusive means of modification”) call this thesis Darwinism.

Finally (although this thesis is not part of evolution strictly so-called), it is often assumed that (6) life itself developed from non-living matter without any special creative activity of God but just by virtue of processes described by the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry: call this the naturalistic origins thesis.

Plantinga takes the first four of these claims to make up the theory of evolution, and together with the fifth claim they make up the Darwinian theory of evolution.

Plantinga argues that despite common belief to the contrary there is no conflict between the Darwinian theory of evolution and theism.  Some – including many Christians and naturalists alike – have thought that there is such a conflict.  More specifically, the claim is that there is a conflict between the Darwinian theory of evolution and the Christian doctrine of creation.  Plantinga describes the Christian doctrine of creation as follows:

A more important source of conflict has to do with the Christian doctrine of creation, in particular the claim that God has created human beings in his image. This requires that God intended to create creatures of a certain kind – rational creatures with a moral sense and the capacity to know and love him – and then acted in such a way as to accomplish this intention.

The Christian doctrine of creation is said to conflict with the Darwinian theory of evolution because of the random nature of the genetic mutations upon which natural selection operates to drive the process of descent with modification forward.  That these genetic mutations are said to be random is thought to be incompatible with the idea that God has brought about this process intentionally according to a preconceived plan.

Plantinga argues, on the contrary, that the sense in which the genetic mutations are random is not incompatible with their being caused by God.  He argues:

You might wonder whether random genetic mutations could be caused by God: if these mutations are random, aren’t they just a matter of chance? But randomness, as construed by contemporary biologists, doesn’t have this implication. According to Ernest Mayer, the dean of post-WWII biology, “When it is said that mutation or variation is random, the statement simply means that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of the organism in a given environment.” Elliot Sober, one of the most respected contemporary philosophers of biology, puts the point a bit more carefully: “There is no physical mechanism (either inside the organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutation would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.” But their being random in that sense is clearly compatible with their being caused by God.

God can cause the right genetic mutations to occur at the right time to bring about his preconceived plan to bring into existence creatures of a certain kind.  The claim that the process of evolution is unguided is not compatible with the Christian doctrine of creation, but that claim is not part of the Darwinian theory of evolution.  It is a philosophical gloss added to the Darwinian theory of evolution, usually without any recognition that it is not strictly part of that theory at all.

It is important to see how limited this result is. Plantinga does not argue that the process of evolution is in fact guided by God’s plan.  Nor does he argue that the process could not possibly have been unguided.  Rather, he argues only that there is no contradiction in supposing that the process of evolution is guided by God. This result is nonetheless significant.  Some naturalists (i.e., atheists) have tried to argue for the falsity of the Christian doctrine of creation from the truth of the Darwinian theory of evolution as follows:

(1) If the Darwinian theory of evolution is true, then the Christian doctrine of creation is false.
(2) The Darwinian theory of evolution is true.
(3) The Christian doctrine of creation is false.

Many Christian accept premise (1). They are forced, therefore, to attack premise (2) in order to reject the conclusion (3).  This has allowed naturalists to present a false dilemma: either we must reject the Christian doctrine of creation or the Darwinian theory of evolution as false.  And, in so far as Christians chose to reject the Darwinian theory of evolution as false rather than the Christian doctrine of creation, then they are anti-science, or at least on conflict with science.  If Plantinga is right, however, premise (1) is simply false, and the argument supplies no warrant for thinking that the conclusion (3) is true even if we do accept that premise (2) is true. There is no conflict.

Plantinga also discusses the question of whether we have any reason to believe that the process of evolution is unguided by God’s plan or that of anyone else. He argues that we have less reason than is commonly supposed to think that it is.  It turns out that all that can be said is that it is at least possible that the process of evolution is unguided.  Plantinga suggests that the process of evolution may be extraordinarily improbable on the supposition that it is unguided, so much so that we may find the supposition that it is guided by God’s plan more probable.  But it is unclear how he could calculate those probabilities.

It is unclear to me why Plantinga makes this argument.  What he has set out to do is to show that the Christian doctrine of creation and the Darwinian theory of evolution are not incompatible.  He simply does not need to go on to show that there are insufficient reasons for believing that the process of evolution is unguided.  That claim is not part of the Darwinian theory of evolution itself or of science more generally (according to Plantinga), and so its denial by a theists does not place the theist into conflict with science.  And, even if there are sufficient reasons to think that the process of evolution is unguided, given the restricted range of evidence permitted by methodological naturalism, that would not provide a good reason for believing that it is unguided provided there are other reasons and evidence outside the range permitted by methodological naturalism for thinking that the process of evolution is guided.

In any case, the Darwinian theory of evolution is not incompatible with theism generally, or the Christian doctrine of creation specifically. And, theists are not required to refute the Darwinian theory of evolution in order to maintain the Christian doctrine of creation, as is commonly supposed by Christians and naturalists (i.e., atheists) alike.

Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies

This excellent and charitable review by the atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel provides an excellent excuse to revisit the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga’s book Where the Conflict Really Lies, which I read earlier this year.

Plantinga’s subject is the alleged conflict between science and theism. Plantinga’s thesis is that,

there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science and theistic religion, but superficial concord and deep conflict between science and naturalism.

Many people think that science and theism are in conflict. They think that science has proved that theism is false or at least lacks any rational warrant. So, either we accept science and reject theism, or we accept theism and reject science. Plantinga’s apologetic strategy reverses this. He argues that on the contrary science and theism are not only compatible, but that it is science and naturalism that are in conflict.

Plantinga argues for three claims:

(1) Plantinga takes up a number of specific areas of alleged conflict between science and theism, and shows that upon careful examination there is in fact no conflict. In each of the specific areas of alleged conflict, science and theism are shown to be compatible.

(2) Plantinga argues that science and theism are not merely compatible, but in deep concord.

(3) Plantinga argues that there is a conflict between science and naturalism. So, in contrast to science and theism, which are shown to be compatible with one another, science and naturalism are shown to be incompatible.

I will consider each of these three claims in subsequent posts. In the remainder of this post I want to define what Plantinga means by theism and naturalism, and to note something important about what his argument does not even purport to show.

Plantinga defines theism as follows. Theism,

is the thought that there is such a person as God: a personal agent who has created the world and is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good.

Naturalism is the denial that theism is true – it is the claim that, “there is no such person as God, or anything like God.”

Note that none of Plantinga’s three claims is the claim that theism is true. Even if Plantinga succeeds in establishing that there is no conflict between science and theism, but rather deep concord between them, and that by contrast there is a conflict between science and naturalism, that will not show that theism is true. Plantinga’s argument is purely negative. He shows that some purported arguments for thinking that theism is false do not work. He does not supply any arguments for thinking that theism is true. The theist is still obliged to provide reasons for thinking that theism is true, and not merely compatible with and in deep concord with science while naturalism by contrast is in conflict with science.


Nancy Folbre discusses the twilight of the public corporation.

Edward Alden discusses the new emerging consensus of economists that trade plays a larger role in stagnant income growth for the middle class.

A National Employment Law study finds that the Great Recession has continued and accelerated the decline of the middle class, with most of the job gains as the economy slowly recovers coming in low wage sectors such as services and retail rather than middle wage sectors sectors such as manufacturing.

A Congressional Research Service report shows that inequality in wealth increased during the Great Recession. According to the report, in 2010 the bottom 50% of the population owned just 1.1% of the nation’s wealth.

According to an Economic Policy Institute study, the trade deficit with China cost the U. S. more than 2.7 million jobs between 2001 and 2011. The study suggests that the trade deficit is caused by a high dollar (relative to the Chinese currency) which itself is the result of a conscious policy by China.

Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute argues in a new report that the decline of union density (the percentage of the workforce that is represented by unions) is a major cause in wage stagnation. Mishel writes:

Between 1973 and 2011, the median worker’s real hourly compensation (which includes wages and benefits) rose just 10.7 percent. Most of this growth occurred in the late 1990s wage boom, and once the boom subsided by 2002 and 2003, real wages and compen­sation stagnated for most workers—college graduates and high school graduates alike. This has made the last decade a “lost decade” for wage growth. The last decade has also been characterized by increased wage inequality between workers at the top and those at the middle, and by the continued divergence between overall productivity and the wages or compensation of the typical worker.

A major factor driving these trends has been the ongoing erosion of unionization and the declining bargaining power of unions, along with the weakened ability of unions to set norms or labor standards that raise the wages of comparable nonunion workers.